

# MIT GOV/LAB

## PODCAST SERIES: POWER TO THE WHO

### Episode 4: Jumoke Oduwole, Special Advisor to the President of Nigeria on Ease of Doing Business [Nigeria]

**Carlos** 00:01

What is the future of governance? How do governments innovate with citizens not just for citizens power to the who built on our recent work at the innovation initiative of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Governance Lab. At the lab, we work with reformers, public service leaders, technologists and designers at the heart of governance innovation, where new solutions tackle complex problems to improve the relationship between citizens, government and civil society. I'm Carlos Centeno, your host and Associate Director of Innovation at the MIT GOV/LAB And this has Power to the Who Nigeria is one of the most vibrant economies in Africa. It's the top destination for startup investments in the continent, followed by South Africa and Egypt. And yet it continues to be difficult to do business in Nigeria. Improving how business is done in the country is not just important, because it can increase the prosperity of the country. It can also be a catalyst to reform and rethink our processes and services can be more transparent and accountable to citizens. There's a place in the government tasked with doing justice, the presidential enabling business environment council was founded in 2017. and is led by Dr. Jumoke Oduwole, a reformer with a background in law who is tackling red tape one reform at a time. Tell us about one of the many reforms you've been able to tackle and how you went about it.

**Dr. Oduwole** 01:35

Oh, they've been several. Is there one? In several, um, I think the visa on arrival was a very popular one. Yeah. So with the visa on arrival, it was on the books, but it wasn't being implemented. It's an electronic visa 48 hours. And you can apply for that. The window is about two weeks before your travel date. And the traveler comes down with an electronic document. And then you get the visa at the airport on arrival in Nigeria. So this, the private sector has really, really loved this because what it means is that I can meet you here in The Hague today. And by Friday, you could be in Nigeria, having a meeting with me and my business partners. So it's sort of for companies, business travel became much easier. And where it used to be such a headache, it's no longer such a headache, a small, small fix for a big impact. Yes, but how was it before because right now, I've gone through the visa on arrival times. I don't even know how it was before. Before it was weeks, you have to travel to the Nigerian embassy, wherever so you from Boston would have to go to Design New York or DC. And you might have to go back. It was really quite grueling.

**Carlos** 03:08

And how does it Now diving into the nitty gritty of design? Do you map this journey and say, This is how how it is right now? Yes. And then who does that? Oh, is this a team? The team?

**Dr. Oduwole** 03:21

Yes. So we go on field work. So for instance, if we want to map a very thorny one, sort of the time it takes to export a particular commodity. So we're following the process from desk to desk, the amount of documentation, the amount of people the level of human contact, the amount of opacity or transparency, the cost. So literally the cost and the speed, and the transparency and literally the people excuse the processes, and infrastructure.

**Carlos** 03:58

So, so you map Okay, so you map the current state? And then do you map what you'd like to see or do you have benchmarks? How do you move forward?

**Dr. Oduwole** 04:06

Yeah. So we map the current state, we also do a lot of mystery shopping. And because I stopped point is listening to private sector. So when the the elevation, the level of noise about a particular pain point, starts growing, or people reaching out to us, can you look at this, or maybe it's something that was already on our radar, maybe because of rankings or because we just know that okay, businesses need credit businesses need to pay their taxes. So we also have some of those reforms that we're looking at. So we map the process. We sometimes get external consultants to map the process. We get private sector to give us a lot of information, where there's corruption, let us know the actuality. So there are two different maps. There's the official What government agencies say, Oh, this takes two days, this takes so what's on the books? And then there's the unofficial process. So we might both, and we layer them on each other. And we show them to the council that this is the official timeline, and steps to export, cocoa. And this is what happens, in actuality, this is supposed to take a week, in practice, it takes up to six weeks, because of congestion at the ports because of this particular gates, gate keeper, you know, so whatever it is, we're gathering a lot of information about what's going wrong, what's going right. And then we listen to private sector, what they would like to see. And then we do a lot of research on other claims, like ours. So we look at what other similar countries are doing. So the information is readily available. If you if it's something that the World Bank has been tracking, you can see, okay, what are the processes and seaports in these types of countries? And then since it's something that's something that's geographically linked, you benchmark the seaports in your region. So the ports in West Africa? What are the amount of documentation that they have? How many agencies do they have other ports? How many security agencies? How many sort of standards organization food and drug, drug enforcement? Who do they have there? So we do global best practice? For instance, with the seaports, you benchmark? What's happening in Singapore? What's happening? In some top ports around the world? They look at what's happening in the ports around you. Is it technology? Is it people issues is it processes. So with that, we saw that Nigeria had huge amounts of paperwork. So the first thing we did was to try to reduce the amount of paperwork. And we did that successfully, both for import and export. And then after you, after you do that, and see what you'd like to see, or you identify what you'd like to see, then the negotiation begins, you have to start negotiating space with the government agencies, because they don't want to change. So you can't go from zero to 100 in a day, you have to start saying, Okay, this year, can we go from 10 processes to seven? What would it take to get this down to three? Why do you need to have this process? That's all because that's the way it's always been done. But do we really need it that way? Then we show them what other countries are doing. And we explain the impact. So we explained that you want your children to have jobs, and you need

factories here. While this process is making investors take their factories to the neighboring country. So you have in your hands the ability to create the future that you want to see. So we we show them how they fit into the economic story. And now we're all on the same team. And I haven't even talked about the work we do with state governments, with the judiciary with small claims courts, with the sub national tracking for all the states to replicate the payback model. Because businesses are domiciled in states. So we work with all the state MDS as well of officials there. And the the story is really team Nigeria, it's one team. So it's not federal being the boss of state or, you know, we're basically one team because we all have to deliver for private sector, because it's one economy.

**Carlos** 08:46

So let's take a step back. I'm so curious, how did you get to where you are? There doesn't seem to be a path that gets you to this point.

**Dr. Oduwole** 08:53

Okay, I'll tell you a story. So we, we were on this field tour from Cambridge, a whole bunch of us from different countries, Russia, you know, just from everywhere, African countries, European countries. And so we all kind of got on guard there with that professor, Daniel back to him. And we were like, hanging out in the hallway. And then I saw the Canadian economists. They were about 79 of them going to lunch 79 Economists Wow, of Canada. And so I wanted to meet the Nigerian delegation, right. So let me even because I peeked into the negotiation Hall and the night Yes, it was empty. So I went to the phonebook. And I found the number four the mission and I called and I said, Hi, I'm a Nigerian student from Cambridge University's like, hello, what do you want that you're in trouble? I said, No, I'm not in trouble. I'm here at the WTO on a field trip with all sorts of students, everybody's sort of connecting, and there's no you. So he said, Hold on a minute, I'll be right there. So he came picked me up. He came from the office to the WTO. He picked me up, I'm still in touch with him till today. He's now retired, Ambassador out the academy, he took me on a tour around Geneva. And in that time, I had a crash course of the limitations of developing countries. He was covering Geneva and Brussels, the sheer magnitude of technical meetings that need to be attended is literally impossible, if you don't have the manpower, the resources to adequately represent your country. And these are technical negotiations, just even keeping up with the agenda, and the volume of work. So that was the Nigerian delegation story. Fast forward when I went to do my doctorate at Stanford, I started with a master's. And again, I revisited the negotiation story at the WTO. I looked at the cotton for those this cotton, upland cotton case, the US and the EU. And then Brazil was leading the charge for developing countries, and added these for West African countries that are cotton producers, are really should be at the forefront of dispute settlement. But they didn't want to join the dispute. So they were third parties to the dispute. And why this is important is because cotton wasn't the biggest thing going on for Brazil. But for these poor African countries, cotton was huge for them. Western Central African countries, about 13 of them depend on cotton to a large extent. But these four only agreed to be third parties, they don't have the capacity. They also have a fragmentation going on. That means that donor countries can influence what they do or don't do. So they don't exactly want to be in a dispute settlement process and get into a politically touchy situation. So Brazil led the charge. And there was a big, further eye opener, what I already knew intuitively from that one field trip, while I was at Cambridge, became a lot more real in terms of lawyers representation, or lack thereof. And then after the Masters, I continued with my doctorate. And again, this time I worked on actual negotiation strategy, as a lawyer identify and stop at

dispute settlement, because I realized that before you get to the dispute, there were rules, and how are the rules negotiated? And more importantly, who sets the agenda? Because whoever sets the agenda dictates exactly where everything is going. So that was my story, getting into international trade as symmetry and negotiation strategy. Fast forward, finished that at Stanford, got my doctorate and went back home. And then the question of what to do with all this information, and what to do with all this knowledge. By this time, I had left investment banking, obviously, in a very dramatic way, with a 90% pay cut. And my husband was like, how exactly is this going to work? And I said, Well, you know, my heart was really in academia, in impacting minds at that time. So after working in investment, banking, commercial banking, corporate banking, I finally was able to get a job at my university. And while everybody was asking me, why are you coming back, you're doing so well in private sector? I hope you know, reality check. This is going to be a huge pay cut. This is going to be not as exotic as the life you think you're living now. My mom who was the register at the time was like, four, you know, you're doing so well out there. And I remember my father told me one day when we were just negotiating this thing, he was like, just do exactly what you want to do, you can win the Nobel Prize. And he just said that to me, and he said, you know, just basically, why not do it. So academia led me to this journey on negotiation strategy and developing countries. And the economic challenges that developing countries face and why things are the way they are. But I've never appreciated the victim card. I don't like the argument of least developed countries I don't like the arguments of it's not that help isn't needed. But I think that you lift yourself up, you look at what needs to be done, you devise a strategy. If you need human resources and negotiation strategy, then you teach that in your law schools, you teach that to your economics students, and you develop the capacity. And I know countries that have done that. Even Uruguay, really, really focused on doing that. And they had, I remember, a young lady like under 30 chairing one of the negotiation committees, and I was really so impressed when I was doing my doctoral research. But I'm back to coming back. I got so many offers. From law firms, come and be partner, oil and gas companies, it was just a time that I had to really dig that deep down. And remember why I went to Stanford in the first place. Because by now, my profile was looking quite interesting. Masters from Cambridge, two degrees from Stanford, getting more accomplished. So I turned down those jobs and I went right back to the classroom, because I realized more than ever that I needed to teach, or what I had learned, because the exact reason why there was a dearth of skilled negotiators of skilled lawyers, economists, negotiators, diplomats in this area was because nobody was investing. In fact, all the trade lawyers that I knew who were Africa, working at White and case working outside the continent, or working in development institutions, certainly known were lecturing in a public university in Nigeria. For then getting back to academia. And settling down that this is this is the path I'm going to take. I did bring back a lot of skills, I learned how to write a really good abstract. So I got to go for a lot of conferences, and my colleagues used to one that I got to know where funding is available. I remember chasing one guy down. He's number was on the internet. He wasn't replying my emails. And actually, that was the Mozambique conference that got me the visiting professorship chair. And I called, like, you know, I submitted this abstract. I didn't get a response. I hope you got my email. And he was like, how did you get my number? I'm like, it's online. He was at home having dinner. But um, he took it off the next day. But the tenacity to chase down funding, chase down opportunities. And I say to people, when when they say, How can you be in a public university after working in investment banking, after accumulating four degrees from some of the best universities in the world. And I say that the opportunities are endless. Everything that the world has ever told me is a disadvantage. being black, being female, being African. Those are the very things that have given me immense

opportunities in my life. Look at how I got to meet MIT. Yeah, coming to speak at an African students conference. So I really embrace diversity. I embrace tenacity, and digging deep and making lemonade out of lemons.

**Carlos 19:17**

And we're making lemonade out of lemons now. You are in public and all these things are coming together the tenacity, the ability to chase down maybe the administrators Yes, yes. How does that working out? And do you feel like you're now prepared to take on this role?

**Dr. Oduwole 19:36**

Well, it's interesting you say so I've actually had pause to pause and reflect on all the skills picked up along the way. And that's why I laughed when you said how did I get here because it was just like a Rolling Stone from from role to role. So I was in academia, and I had zero interest in it. hadn't really crossed my mind, in getting into government. So there were two things because my research for my dissertation was at a government level, it's like country to country negotiating agreements. I had thought about it, of being an advisor to the Minister of Trade, like that's where it's domiciled in Nigeria. But when I got back, my son was three, I wasn't enthused by the whole situation. I live in Lagos, that was Abuja, my older daughter was eight. It just wasn't what I really wanted to do at the time. So I decided to just lean back and lean into why I went for the degree in the first place. And that was to come back and teach Nigerian students. But fast forward. About four years from then, for five years, there was a government transition. And for the first time, I could really relate to the person who was the vice presidential candidate at a time. I remember the day he got selected to be the vice presidential candidate. And he's my boss right now. So he's an academic like me, he saw like, No, I used to run a nonprofit, for about a year when I came back to Nigeria, in addition to academia, online development, and he was the chair of that board. And I thought to myself if he was going to be the vice president, and certainly there's a lot I can do there. At this time, I was ready to pivot. I had been back in academia for a few years, I had had this Prince Claus, visiting professorship, so it was just as that was ending about seven years ago now, or eight, no more than about nine years ago now. And the elections were coming in. So I did him a short brief, after after following the complaint closely and then they won. I did have a short brief and basically put my hand up for a role. The role didn't exist. So I put together what I thought he really needed, of course, someone to clean up all multilateral agreements, or international agreements, and all the economic policy issues that I could identify. And I went to see him, and he was like, you go to work. And you like a human rights lawyer or something? I said, yes. Because everybody knew about my work on the right to development. What I was basically asking to be on his economic team, not his legal team. And I got the job, created my own KPIs created the job description named the job, basically, you need an aide on your team working on these issues. And from there, even I started, I started learning a lot. And I realized that, yes, it's important to fix international agreements. But even more so is working on the domestic business climate, because that's what will you can fix an agreement. And the people cannot access and use the benefits of the agreement, because the capacity or the position isn't there. So I started talking about business climate reforms. And then we formed a team, the minister then, and we started the ideation for this Presidential Enabling Business Environment Council, which is now the PEBEC. That was about seven years ago. And the ease of doing business intervention is essentially to work on the enabling environment to make sure that the micro small and medium enterprises can thrive. By thriving it means government gets out of the way,

removes the bureaucratic bottlenecks, the relics, the rent-seeking all the things that hamper their ability to soar and thrive.

**Carlos** 24:42

So what were the main things PEBEC was trying to tackle?

**Dr. Oduwole** 24:45

So we started small, there was three things we were looking at access to entry and exit of goods into the country because we're a trading nation. entry and exit of people and then transparency. Those were the three things that we just thought, Okay, let's start on these three things. And that was October-November of 2016. And then we decided that to to make it holistic, externally verifiable reform process, let's adopt the cycle that the World Bank flagship Ease of Doing Business report uses to track the lifecycle of a small business. So from inception from starting a business, all the way to insolvency, if a business die that should be able to die with dignity. So we adopted that model. And we started working on that, from 2017. It was a very poignant and personal journey in trying to deliver reform. So we had consultants that have done this round the world and we invited one team to come support us in this. And it was interesting that the technocrats supported us. But the bureaucratic arm that was a consortium basically said one day to my team, and I, you know what, forget about this year. You can't make any traction, just wait till next year. And this was when we had been working so hard. It was it was demoralizing, but we decided to just ignore them, and just not listen to them. So we just worked with the people who were ready to support us and help us and believe in us, and just ignored the naysayers. And that year, we moved up 24 places in the ranking, it had never happened before. And the whole world just noticed, suddenly Nigeria has woken up. Now the mandate of the council is twofold. It's about removing the actual bureaucratic bottlenecks. And then it's also about improving the perception. And that's where the rankings come in. But it's impossible to improve the perception in an externally validated ranking without doing the work. So we started working with ministries departments and agencies. We picked some priority wants to start with. And then later, as the years went by, we extended to legislative reforms, working with the National Assembly, to now we work with all hands on levels of government. So that means federal, state, local government, judiciary, and legislature as well as the executive federal government.

**Carlos** 27:51

I can't imagine you made a lot of friends.

**Dr. Oduwole** 27:54

Well, you know, I did actually, I Did I, did.

**Carlos** 27:59

Did you get a lot of pushback or? What was the moment when you realized what you needed to do to, to push this forward.

**Dr. Oduwole** 28:11

Okay. So that's where the tenacity and the personality comes in. Because you have to bring all sorts of skills to bear because you're working at the top, you're working with ministers, you're working at a



presidential level, you're presenting this is the direction that the council is going. But you also have to you can't stay at that level, because nothing gets done. So you also have to roll up your sleeves and go into the ports, go into the airports, go into the offices, speak with the officers, the boots on the ground, with your team, like you cannot lead from the back with an intervention like this, people have to see that you care, you mean it. And that you're serious. And that you can get the political will to make sure...

**Carlos** 29:08

I want to go back to what you said about carrot and sticks. And, yeah, I like the story about the Vice President calling and when you were telling the story, I thought this was going to be a story about pressure and, you know, making the other person feel that they had to deliver even if they didn't want to, but it was a story about actually making them proud that they get a call from the vice. But yes, so that was surprising. But it also comes to my attention that your team is the enabling business counsel and sometimes that carrot and stick becomes a challenge. Because to enable the business environment, you also have to have the teeth to enforce the business environment. And that's why I was listening to the story expecting an enforcement type of approach. But how do you deal with that? And maybe tell us a story of where you had to pull teeth? Show the teeth, but maybe that's not the best way to do it? Or it is? I don't know.

**Dr. Oduwole** 29:08

Like one of my favorite stories is, is one of the the he was the technology officer at the Corporate Affairs Commission, and we were trying to push a particular reform that required automation. And we'd had some pushback, it can't be done. It can't be done. And this day, I was calling him because we had the World Bank deadline, right. And he wasn't picking up my calls. Like he was so sick of me. At that time that he wasn't even picking up my calls. I said, You know what? And I was actually in Lagos attending an event with the Vice President. So I sent him a text and I said, You know what? I'm here with the vice president. And he says that you need to get this done. And he's actually going to call you. He said you need to get this done. And he means it like you need to get this done. And then I told the Vice President that you know what? I said to this guy, he wasn't picking up my call. And I told him that you said he needs to get this done. And my boss was like, 'give me his number'. And right there, the office places a call, and this guy says in his office, and who does he get a call from? The Vice President, who is a really nice guy. So he's like, Mr. Adajee, I understand. You're going to deliver this for us, right? Because you know that we need this for this, right? And of course, we said that just like, 'Yes, your Excellency'. He was beyond excited. He told everybody, the Vice President called me, I need to get this done, I need to it was just like night and day. So that's the that's where political will and engagement comes in, and the carrot and the stick, and being able to pull support, and go into granularity and vice versa, and was really engaged in the details. You had the patience to listen, and he was just very interested still is in the project. So it's not been all roses, there have been a lot of reforms that we couldn't deliver. There'll be reforms that unraveled. While we continue to track, we believe very strongly in data and in the empirical and keeping a tight, measuring on effectiveness of the forms. That's a very interesting question, Carla. So we don't have enough teeth to pull with with the public and civil service. They owe these rules. So it's not like private sector that you can hire, fire, promote, demote, take away responsibilities and responsibilities, their rules, their cadence, their structures. And like you said, as the transformation office we're an enabler, were a supporting role, wer'e a backend role, effectively, trying to coerce or support ministries, departments and agencies to deliver these reforms for the for the

private sector. I think that for teeth, what we decided to do was that we know that civil servants respond to what's written and the records. So we went for an executive order is the first executive order of the administration. It was signed in 2017. It was before Trump popularized the executive orders, we had had this Executive Order 001 and its on transparency and efficiency of public service delivery. Now with that, we also went into training to enable. So we develop the structure and a curriculum on how do you create a reform? How do you enable? So we asked ministries, departments and agencies to nominate reform champions, those are the focal persons, and then five member teams to work on the operational end for the report.gov, which is our app that is on Google Play and Apple Store. And that's a feedback mechanism. Now what all this did was that we could then track what they were doing, and release reports ranking them. So no agency really wanted to see themselves we started ranking 55 agencies, and no one wanted to be last. But because we didn't have that much by way of a stick we invented a carrot. We started the PEBEC awards, recognizing public and civil servants who had done exemplary work and delivered impactful reforms. And that was very widely publicized and a dinner picture with the Vice President. So both the agency and the officers were getting awarded. And that worked quite well. We were also doing well on the World Bank ranking. So that was also another good thing, but very difficult for us on the consequence management side, and it got progressively more difficult as we cleared the low hanging fruit, and started going to the more challenging reforms. So we also had to learn how to map the stakeholder terrain, and see where the dynamics of power and influence and cultivate friends all across. And you may think, just senior levels of court corridors of power, but not really. If you want to pass legislation, at the National Assembly, you better cultivate the Clerk of the House or the Clerk of the National Assembly. Those are the public, civil servants who will make sure that your bill is moving through the process. If you want to deliver a reform at the ports, you're really trying to cultivate the officers who relate to the importers and exporters, because whatever memo is coming down from Abuja, they are the ones and customs officers have a disproportionate amount of discretion to apply in terms of tariffs. And we didn't always have a lot of success in that respect. So we've learned a whole lot. And we document we release periodic reports, we release studies from time to time, we had a very interesting pilot Cost of Compliance Survey on Lagos and Abuja, because we were listening, again, we spend a lot of time listening to private sector, we have a funnel system, where we aggregate global best practices, but we have a lot of stakeholder engagement with Nigerian private sector or businesses operating in Nigeria, I should say, because not all of them are Nigerian to really identify where the shoe is pinching. And that helps us with prioritization. And that we were able to progressively work on the trust deficit. So even people who don't like the administration at all will tell you objectively that this team has really worked hard has tried to represent the interests of private sector has been the champion of private sector within government. Trying to make sure that policies are functioning and not flip flopping and being there for private sector.

**Carlos 37:45**

I like this approach of rewards and sort of having role models to showcase role models that people who are doing well, teams that are doing well. And you mentioned there were 55 agencies. And of course, I have to ask you said nobody wants to be last. There is one that is last. And you don't have to say which one it is. But I'm curious, as an example, because you mentioned the incentives of being first or second, being at the top. What happens to those teams are last? The ones that were the gap exists, and how do you feel that gap? What is there a role for for your team there?



**Dr. Oduwole** 38:28

So we continue to try to point it out. That's the first thing. So some teams try to be in denial, or excuses. And, and we try to determine whether it's just a lack of coordination within the that particular team, that particular agency, whether it's just not being prioritized or taken seriously. So if they're not submitting their monthly reports, then it's an automatic zero. Some teams are reluctant, because there's no engagement from the top. So we do quite a bit of stakeholder mapping. Every year, we have a strategy. And we're looking at where to deploy most of our efforts. So what is the most important reform that will have the most impact on private sector? So the level of difficulty and impact are the two indices that we use. So if you have a reform that will be very difficult to implement, but the impact will be huge, then we can really, really try to tackle that. Of course, it's a no brainer. If it has impact, and it's easy to implement. Then we prioritize it and we saw we were able to scoop up the quick wins. But as we were delivering on those, it starts getting progressively more difficult. And then you have to be measuring the reforms by impact. So if we spend a lot of effort and resources, and we're not, we're not a big team, on a reform, then it has to deliver the maximum impact. So when we ranked the agencies, that's basically an internal conversation in government for efficiency and transparency. But as a team, we are constantly looking at what private sector has said to us that we listen to. We're constantly prioritizing where the most benefits will be. And so agencies that haven't done particularly well, that would deliver a huge amount of impact for private sector would be the ones that we would prioritize working with. But sometimes, I mean, we haven't always been successful that, at least, there's at least one example I can think of that will be hugely impactful, but from leadership down, have not been engaged. So the project needs more and more political capital, sustained political capital and sustained political attention. Beyond even sort of the role, the level of the council, the actual Federal Executive Council, and the government as a whole needs to have a coordinated response. And sometimes political issues get in the way. But we're glad that we've had quite some impact. We've been able to deliver some landmark legislation working with the National Assembly

**Carlos** 41:43

For for the listeners, I think it'd be interesting. What is a successful reform mean. And then I'm gonna ask you about a not successful one.

**Dr. Oduwole** 41:54

Yeah, yeah. Gosh, so successful reform is one that private sector had indicated, I can a heat map will be 10. And we've been able to deliver it, and not only deliver it, we've gotten verification from private sector, that it's been implemented, and that it's delivering tangible results, in terms of reducing the cost, reducing the time, and that there's more transparency in the process. So there's, there's specific empirical indicators to determine whether or not a reform is impactful or successful. It's not really about how we feel about it, or even what people feel about it. They're measurable. So all the reforms can be distilled into people issues, processes, and then to a lesser extent, infrastructure, which is kind of outside the scope, because it's hard infrastructures outside our scope. But there's still some things, especially when you start talking about technology. So people processes infrastructure, and we're looking at the cost, the time and transparency.

**Carlos** 43:09

So what's in store for public? What are you thinking about these days?

**Dr. Oduwole** 43:13

We're now bringing in a lot more focus on, on looking at how the innovation and creativity has worked. And the measurable impact is there for all to see, we've tracked everything. So that gives us a powerful tool to negotiate with government. And you know, I always tell the team success has many friends. The reason once you've been able to demonstrate success, you have a credibility to ask for more. So the same way we were able to, to move from a startup with no budget, and really not a lot of visibility to where we are now. I have no doubt that post 2023 May, any astute government would want to expand the scope of this and give it probably more influence and more power for the consequence management bit because that's really where the traction will come in.

**Carlos** 44:17

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